What Happened to the 9/11 Commission? What a Century of Riot Commissions Teaches us about America’s Dependence on Independent Commissions by Lupo, Lindsey
Ralph Bunche Journal of Public Affairs
Volume 3
Issue 1 Issues on Voter Participation among African
Americans and Bureaucratic Behavior
Article 3
June 2014
What Happened to the 9/11 Commission? What a
Century of Riot Commissions Teaches us about
America’s Dependence on Independent
Commissions
Lindsey Lupo
Point Loma Nazarene University, lindseylupo@pointloma.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalscholarship.bjmlspa.tsu.edu/rbjpa
Part of the Environmental Policy Commons, Other Political Science Commons, Public Affairs
Commons, Urban Studies Commons, and the Urban Studies and Planning Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Barbara Jordan Mickey Leland School of Public Affairs - Digital Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Ralph Bunche Journal of Public Affairs by an authorized administrator of Barbara Jordan Mickey Leland School of Public
Affairs - Digital Scholarship. For more information, please contact rodriguezam@TSU.EDU.
Recommended Citation
Lupo, Lindsey (2014) "What Happened to the 9/11 Commission? What a Century of Riot Commissions Teaches us about America’s
Dependence on Independent Commissions," Ralph Bunche Journal of Public Affairs: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 3.
Available at: http://digitalscholarship.bjmlspa.tsu.edu/rbjpa/vol3/iss1/3
Ralph Bunche Journal of Public Affairs                 Spring 2014 
 
- 21 - 
What Happened to the 9/11 
Commission? What a Century of 
Riot Commissions Teaches us about 
America’s Dependence on 
Independent Commissions 
 
Lindsey Lupo 
Point Loma Nazarene University 
 
                                                                                                                       
 
In August of 2004, the bipartisan 9/11 Commission released its report to much media buzz. 
However, when all ten commissioners reconvened in late 2005 to issue a report card on 
progress made on the recommendations of the Commission, they issued five Fs, twelve Ds, 
nine Cs, and one A minus. This article looks at independent commissions in the United 
States and the role they play as flak-catchers—stopgaps that assuage public fears while 
giving the appearance of decisive government action. It uses historical and comparative 
case-study analysis to portray how the 9/11 Commission operated in a manner similar to 
U.S. race riot commissions, despite differences in inception, focus, and jurisdiction. The 
result for both riot commissions and the 9/11 Commission is a “management” of the crisis 
rather than an understanding, followed by little in the way of actual policy change. One 
should expect similar outcomes whenever an independent commission is appointed. 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
Over a decade ago, the United States government charged a ten-member independent, 
bipartisan commission to study the 9/11 attacks in order to more fully understand the 
circumstances surrounding the events, as well as to provide recommendations to prevent 
future attacks. In August of 2004, the 9/11 Commission released its report to much media 
buzz and fanfare.  Almost immediately, the White House resisted the report; indeed, 
President Bush initially opposed even the creation of the Commission (Kean and Hamilton 
2006) and upon release of its report, guardedly referred to it as “constructive” (King and 
Quijano 2004). Four years after its release, the chairman and vice chairman of the 
Commission, Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton respectively, publicly criticized the 
lack of governmental response to their recommendations. Further, all ten commissioners 
reconvened in late 2005 to issue a “report card” on the recommendations made by the 
Commission. They issued five Fs, twelve Ds, nine Cs, and one A-minus (Kean and 
Hamilton 2006). 
 In addressing politically or socially important problems or events, the United States 
has frequently turned to independent, blue-ribbon commissions. Americans are typically 
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familiar with a few of them, recalling perhaps the Warren Commission, the Kerner 
Commission, the Packard Commission, the Tower Commission, or the 9/11 Commission. 
But the history of the independent commission reaches even further back – President 
George Washington instituted a presidential commission in 1794 in an effort to quell the 
rising Whiskey Rebellion.  The U.S. government’s heavy reliance on independent 
commissions is indeed a long-standing tradition.  
 But, what is the efficacy of these independent commissions? Herein lies the puzzle - 
they are at once incredibly ineffective and effective. As problem-solving entities that affect 
real change in the political system, they are ineffective, as evidenced by the 9/11 
Commission’s own self-issued failing report card on progress. One woman widowed by the 
9/11 attacks expressed her disappointment: “If you were to tell me that two years after the 
murder of my husband on live television that we wouldn't have one question answered, I 
wouldn't believe it” (Breitweiser 2003). However, as mechanisms of evasion that allow the 
government to delay action or elude responsibility altogether, they are incredibly effective. 
Both sides of this paradox are harmful to the basic function of democracy, a system of 
government reliant on government responsiveness. Indeed, the U.S. government continues 
to depend on independent commissions to provide answers and presumably affect change, 
but neither is the typical outcome of these commissions. Even if some clarity does emerge, 
it is often ignored. It has been over two hundred years since Washington’s commission on 
the Whiskey Rebellion and during that time, policy change through independent 
commissions has been rare or non-existent.  Why then does the American public continue to 
be comforted and satiated when the government appoints a commission?  
 This article looks at independent commissions in the United States and the role they 
play as “flak-catchers” – stopgaps for uncertain or unfavorable judgments cast onto the 
political system. Because they work as effective mechanisms of evasion, giving the 
appearance of government action while at the same time dodging responsibility, 
government bodies, particularly executives, have frequently and readily turned to 
independent commissions. However, independent commissions are typically riddled with 
inefficiencies that inevitably hinder their work. This article will look at the obstacles faced 
by these commissions as they deal with some of the most complex social and political 
issues of our time. Some of the obstacles are a product of the bureaucratic nature of the 
commission process, while others are created by the commission itself, in order to preserve 
the status quo. Still others are the creation of the instituting body who finds little incentive 
in implementing the recommendations of a temporary, nonelected body that lacks any real 
power. Thus, the central issue discussed here is the way in which independent commissions 
are utilized as equivocal tools that both ease public anxiety and allow public officials to 
claim credit for decisive action. Independent commissions are an easy and effective go-to 
for U.S. public officials because they act as deflectors, giving the appearance of action and 
serving to satiate the public’s demand for explanation and answers, while at the same time 
evading actual policy response. Government officials have therefore developed a 
dependence on these commissions. This article specifically focuses on the barriers 
commissions face, comparing the commissions that have often followed U.S. urban race 
riots to the 9/11 Commission. The riots that have occurred over the last century in America 
have typically been followed by an investigative, blue-ribbon commission, and therefore 
provide us with a catalog of comparative cases for the 9/11 Commission.  
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U.S. Race Riot Commissions 
There is one political phenomenon where the use of independent commissions is 
particularly constant in the United States—urban race riots. Riot commissions are the 
institutional bodies appointed by an executive, a legislature, or law enforcement body in the 
aftermath of a race riot to determine a riot timeline, investigate causes, study the dynamics, 
and offer prescriptions for change. Over the last century, most racial uprisings in America’s 
urban cities have been followed by a government-initiated commission, charged with 
studying the causes of the riot and issuing recommendations for societal and political 
changes that might prevent reoccurrence. Yet, these commissions fail to produce any 
significant changes, leading to what Michael Lipsky and David Olson have referred to as 
“commission politics” (Lipsky and Olson 1977).  
The phrase “commission politics” refers to the way in which crises are subjected to 
bureaucratic processing, resulting in the management of the crisis rather than a broader 
understanding of what led to or caused the crisis. With regard to race riot commissions, the 
commission tends to focus on the restoration of law and order, rather than the deeper social 
problems penetrating America’s urban cities. It is thus an elite response to the racial 
violence – one that seeks to appear in accordance with democratic norms of accountability 
and responsiveness, but is typically little more than an evasion tactic, or worse, a vehicle for 
pushing through previously formulated elite policy preferences. We will likely never know 
the intention of officials who set up the commissions, whether the intent from the beginning 
is to obfuscate and placate or whether the evasion comes later, when recommendations are 
revealed and deemed unpalatable. This article does not explore intention so much as 
outcome. The riot commission process effectively appears responsive while also effectively 
depoliticizing the riot violence, framing it as an anomalous breakdown of order. Further, 
once the report is released, it is most often ignored, criticized, or downplayed by the 
instituting body, resulting in the maintenance of status quo politics. Thus, the riot 
commissions tend to be symbolic political bodies that appear responsive but are in fact 
mechanisms of evasion as they are typically short-staffed, under-funded, and generally ill-
equipped. In short, they are “flak-catchers.” 
 
Riot Commissions and the 9/11 Commission 
The central assertion in this article is that the characteristics of race riot commissions are 
mirrored in the 9/11 Commission, as the latter operated, organizationally and symbolically, 
in a manner similar to race riot commissions. Thus, the obstacles faced by the 9/11 
Commission throughout its eighteen month process parallel those that riot commissions 
have faced for the last century. It is therefore not surprising that the 9/11 Commission found 
itself hindered in its work and blocked in its efforts to promote change as we have witnessed 
similar outcomes from riot and other independent commissions. This paper seeks to unpack 
the details of these barriers and obstacles that make commissions little more than flak-
catchers. Indeed, what I show is that the 9/11 Commission followed the flak-catching 
pattern as illustrated by riot commissions. This article argues that these two distinct types of 
independent commissions—riot commissions and the national security-focused 9/11 
Commission—were shaped by similar processes and patterns, and thus had similar 
outcomes. We should expect similar outcomes whenever an independent commission is 
appointed.  
Therefore, the U.S. government’s continued reliance on independent commissions, 
as well as the obstacles these commissions face, will be explored here primarily through an 
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examination of riot commissions during the twentieth century. From here, I will move on to 
an examination of the 9/11 Commission’s process to show that these obstacles—and the 
subsequent flak-catching and lack of substantive outcome—are not unique to riot 
commissions. The way in which independent commissions manage and depoliticize the 
issue at hand is indeed a ubiquitous occurrence. 
Why riot commissions? Race riots are an area in which the government has 
consistently and frequently appointed an independent commission to study the causes of the 
riot, understand the unfolding of riot events, and offer prescriptions for change. This 
frequency and consistency make them valuable comparative foundations, as patterns 
emerge that are useful in establishing a model for understanding independent commissions 
more generally.  In other words, race riot commissions provide a lens through which to 
view the use of and efficacy of other types of commissions. What is interesting is that 
despite very different events that are studied, commissions consistently follow a similar 
pattern and have a similar outcome. For instance, riot commissions study race relations, 
domestic social policy, and law enforcement, while the 9/11 Commission studied the 9/11 
attacks, national security, and American foreign policy. The focus of study was incredibly 
different, and yet, the process and outcome was incredibly similar. Specifically, this article 
argues that the problems that beset the riot commissions are similar to those faced by the 
9/11 Commission, including low funding, staffing shortages, and ultimately, lack of 
implementation of policy recommendations. In analyzing the obstacles faced by riot 
commissions in the United States, this article offers insight into the commission process as 
it operates in other scenarios (both crisis-oriented like the 9/11 commission and non-crisis 
oriented)—how hopes and expectations are raised and subsequently dropped as it becomes 
apparent that the main goal of the commission, which is the appearance of action, is 
fulfilled and nothing more is needed. 
 
Managing America’s Riots: The Three Stages of a Riot Commission 
When government manages rather than seeks to understand a race riot, the riot is de-
politicized and framed as a criminal event, involving a handful of hoodlums rioting for “fun 
and profit,” rather than as a rebellion against a system that is perceived by the rioters as 
unjust and biased. It is interesting to note that the race riot does not trigger legislative 
hearings or decisive executive branch action. In taking the action outside of the traditional 
political system, the riot is further de-politicized. By naming an “independent” commission, 
the instituting body is also able to appear unbiased, thus further legitimating the 
commission. In addition, by delegating the investigation to a non-governing body, the 
appointing executive removes future accountability in terms of implementing 
recommendations. An independent commission may be bipartisan and non-aligned, but it 
also has no authority to actually ensure that action is taken on its final report.  
Commissions bureaucratize events to the point obfuscation is clear. However, if 
we deconstruct the commission process into stages, it helps to illuminate where and how 
exactly the commission acts as a flak-catcher. Therefore, I classify the commission process 
as a three-stage process involving commission formation, the issuing of a report with 
recommendations, and finally, implementation of those recommendations. I turn now to 
some examples of the ways in which specific race riot commissions have adhered to this 
three-stage process and thus acted as flak-catchers. Following the discussion of the riot 
commissions, I will then turn to the 9/11 Commission to show how it too adhered to the 
three stages.  
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One Hundred Years of Riot Commissions 
Riot commissions operate to reduce the sense of urgency and divert attention is, again, not 
surprising. However, I argue here that riot commissions and the 9/11 Commission vary in 
terms of which particular stage of the commission process they were least effective.  In 
other words, some commissions are particularly evasive during the initial commission 
formation stage, while others are more evasive later in the process, perhaps during the 
implementation stage. Some examples of riot commissions over the years will illustrate this 
point. What follows is a discussion of three race riots that have occurred in the last century 
in the United States, with each case study portraying how the three stages of commission 
politics unfolded and acted as barriers to commission success. For instance, in the 
commission stage, funding troubles are common while in the recommendation stage, elites 
pushing for status quo politics often emerge. As we will see, the 9/11 Commission followed 
a similar path. 
 
The 1919 Chicago Riot  
 Less than a month after the 1919 race riot that left 38 people dead in Chicago, 
Governor Frank Lowden instituted a riot commission to study the violence. The 
commission process took over two years, but at almost seven hundred pages, The Negro in 
Chicago report is still considered by race relations scholars to be one of the best academic 
studies on race relations. However, aside from its academic role, it had little impact on 
actual race relations or racial policy in early twentieth century Chicago. The Chicago 
Commission faced a number of obstacles that ultimately prevented it from achieving little 
more than making a worthy contribution to the scholarly study of race relations. The 
commission was plagued by organizational problems throughout its two year process, 
causing it to be a rather fruitless endeavor in actually addressing the root causes of the 
violence. The inefficacies of the Chicago Commission occurred primarily in the 
commission stage and to a lesser extent, in the latter recommendation and implementation 
stages. 
 Time restraints, funding shortages, and lack of resources and infrastructure were all 
issues that afflicted the commission. For instance, with regard to timing, the Commission 
was initially supposed to complete its work by the fall of 1920. The Commission’s 
executive secretary, Graham R. Taylor, urged the Commission to place thoroughness over 
speed (Graham R. Taylor to Francis Shepardson, October 30, 1920, Microfilm Role 30-78, 
Lowden correspondence). Indeed, the Commission took another two years in its process, 
releasing its report in September of 1922, a full three years after the riot. When the report 
was finally released, the newspapers virtually ignored it with only the prominent African 
American newspaper, the Chicago Defender, noting its release. But even the Chicago 
Defender relegated the story to page two, and in fact, the report never made it to the front 
page. Further, during the three year process, Governor Lowden seemingly never prodded 
the commissioners or urged them to finish; in fact, he essentially ignored the process. 
 The timing problems faced by the Chicago Commission are undoubtedly tied to its 
financial problems. The Illinois legislature provided no government funding to the Chicago 
Commission, despite the Commission being state-initiated. Initially, the reason given for the 
lack of funding was that the appointment of the Commission occurred after a regular session 
of the legislature; however, later correspondence indicates that the legislature did vote on 
Commission funding and actually failed to pass the measure that would have provided 
appropriation for Commission expenses (Francis Shepardson to William C. Graves, 
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September 15, 1919, Microfilm Role 30-78, Lowden correspondence). This failure to even 
minimally fund the Commission illustrates the low expectations typically held by the 
instituting body, and perhaps even the high hope that nothing substantive in terms of policy 
change will actually come from the commission process. The government gets credit for 
appearing decisive in a time of crisis, but in failing to provide the Commission with critical 
resources and infrastructure, actual policy change will remain unlikely. 
 Indeed, financial problems are one of the most common obstacles faced by 
independent commissions, including the 9/11 Commission, and financial problems plagued 
the Chicago Commission throughout its three year existence. By the spring of 1920, just a 
few months into the Chicago Commission’s work, the budget was estimated at $30,000, but 
only half that amount had been raised by the finance committee. Further, the Commission 
projected that by the summer, it would have only about $1,000 remaining in its account. 
The financial situation turned out to be even direr than predicted—by August of 1920, only 
$253 remained. Executive Secretary Graham Taylor’s proposal was to speed up the research 
process so as to finish before funds ran out, cut staff positions, and possibly sell furniture 
and typewriters (Minutes, April 21, 1920, Microfilm Role 30-11, Lowden correspondence).
 
 
 This commission illustrates the internal problems that can obstruct a commission’s 
work before the report is even written or released. For the Chicago Commission, it was 
during the commission stage that the Commission experienced funding, timing, and 
resource problems.  All of these aspects led to deep and irresolvable problems in the study 
of the Chicago riot. The result is that the riot was depoliticized as the urgency of the riot 
became tangled up in a mess of internal organizational problems. 
 
The 1967 “USA” Riots 
The Kerner Commission (formally the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders), one of the most well-known independent commissions in American politics, 
studied the summer of 1967 riots around the country. The Commission was established in 
July of 1967, with President Johnson directing the Commission to focus on three areas: 
circumstances, causes, and prevention. However, the Commission faced a number of 
hurdles throughout its tenure. Early in the process, Vice-Chairman John Lindsay wrote to 
his fellow commissioners that the Commission lacked a “sense of urgency” and was in 
jeopardy of becoming “just another Presidential Commission with another report for 
America” (Memo, John V. Lindsay to commission members, January 9, 1968, “Critical 
Comments on Drafts,” National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders Collection, Series 
46, Box 3, LBJ Library). However, the most egregious of the management of the violence 
would come at the end—in the implementation stage—when, publicly, the president only 
minimally acknowledged the report and privately, seethed at its substance. 
 The administration’s discomfort with the report stemmed primarily from the 
financial commitment that would necessarily follow its recommendations. The 
administration found itself in an unwinnable situation. If they asked for funding suggestions 
from the Commission, they feared that commissioners would point to the increasingly 
unpopular war in Vietnam. However, if they did not receive funding suggestions, the 
Commission was free to make sweeping recommendations with little regard for cost. Either 
way, the administration would appear recalcitrant. Thus, the Johnson administration began 
efforts to undermine and minimize the report’s release.  
 President Johnson’s aides recommended a “two-pronged approach” that involved 
leaking the report. Domestic policy aide Joseph Califano wrote the following note to the 
president the week before the report’s scheduled release date: 
6
Ralph Bunche Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 3 [], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://digitalscholarship.bjmlspa.tsu.edu/rbjpa/vol3/iss1/3
Ralph Bunche Journal of Public Affairs                 Spring 2014 
 
- 27 - 
1. Publicly, that you sign Thursday (For Sunday release) the attached statement or 
something similar in response to a transmittal from Governor Kerner praising your 
progress to date. (The report itself has very little good to say about anyone.) 
2. Privately, that you give Christian and me approval to start leaking the report to 
diminish its overall impact, point up its enormous cost and the unrealistic nature of 
its recommendations (Note, Joe Califano to the President, February 28, 1968, “FG 
690 NACCD 2/28-3/13/68,” Central Files Collection, EX FG690, Box 387, LBJ 
Library). 
It is not known whether President Johnson approved this approach but it appears that he did 
as the report was in fact leaked early to the press.  The president felt betrayed by the 
Commission and his administration quietly worked to undermine it, resulting in a very low 
rate of implementation of Commission recommendations.  
 In the days before the executive summary of the report was leaked, presidential aides 
hurried to formulate a response that would look responsive and accountable, and yet that 
was vague enough to allow them to skirt responsibility. Three examples illustrate this 
evasion. First, aides recommended appointing a new commission to analyze the Kerner 
Commission’s work. Second, they recommended referring to the Kerner Commission report 
as only a statement of problems, essentially ignoring the fact that the report contained a list 
of specific recommendations for social reform.  In one memo to the president, aides 
suggested “accepting” and “praising” the report but assured him that he “need not embrace” 
the report (Memo, Ramsey Clark to the President, March 2, 1968, “FG 690 NACCD, 2/28--
3/13/68,” Central Files Collection, EX FG690, Box 387, LBJ Library). Finally, the White 
House publicly took the position that much responsibility for reform lay with the “state and 
local governments, as well as private citizens and institutions” (Memo, Joe Califano to the 
President, March 6, 1968, “Chron File 3/5-3/7/68,” Aides-Califano Collection, Box 33, LBJ 
Library). Two days before the report leaked, Califano wrote the following in a confidential 
memo to the president:  
All of this leads me to again recommend that you issue the statement I sent to you 
Thursday night. I believe it could be issued in the form of a wire from you to 
Kerner, and made public tonight or early tomorrow morning before the Sunday 
telecasts. The statement in no way commits you and leaves you free either to 
follow some sort of task force route or individual department route for review of 
the report. Actually we are at a point where the Budget Bureau, working with the 
departments, could have a thorough review and analysis of the recommendations 
that pertain to the federal government within a few days. We have a good story to 
tell about what we are doing and why we are not doing some of the things the 
commission recommends and we ought to get it out promptly. At the same time, by 
having Kerner send the report to mayors and governors, as well as Congressmen, 
we could place some of the heat on the local level and on the Congress, where it 
belongs (Memo, Joe Califano to the President, March 2, 1968, “National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders,” Central Files Collection, FG632, Box 39, LBJ 
Library).  
The Thursday night statement to which he refers was one that had the president 
telling the country that he had “asked Governor Kerner to send it to members of the Senate 
and the House of Representatives and to the Nation’s governors and mayors” (Memo, Joe 
Califano to the President, February 28, 1968, “Chron File 2/27-2/29/68,” Aides-Califano 
Collection, Box 32, LBJ Library). In widely disseminating the report, the Johnson 
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administration was acting to diffuse responsibility. Yet, given that the other layers and 
branches of government had not instituted the Commission, they had no responsibility to 
undertake costly reforms. Not surprisingly, the governors, mayors, and members of 
Congress that were pinpointed by the White House also did not act, resulting in a 
commission report full of unimplemented and ignored policy recommendations. 
 
The Los Angeles Riots of 1992 
 Following the 1992 Los Angeles riot, there was immediately some clamoring for an 
independent commission. However, President Bush decided against a centralized 
commission, fearing that the report would end up unread and dusty on a shelf. Instead, the 
riot of 1992 was studied by four separate and disconnected riot commissions: the Assembly 
Special Committee on the Los Angeles Crisis, the Senate Special Task Force on a New Los 
Angeles, the Presidential Task Force on Los Angeles Recovery, and the Special Advisor to 
the Board of Police Commissioners on the Civil Disorder in Los Angeles. Each played a 
distinct role in the overall study of the 1992 riot, but together, the four commissions 
primarily managed the riot in the second and third stages – recommendation and 
implementation. 
Unlike previous riot commissions, these commissions were rather obscure, lacking 
in prominence, and unknown to the general public. Even commissioners who served on the 
commissions had a hard time remembering that they served.  One wrote to me: “I was not 
very involved in the report because I never thought it meant anything” (Assembly Special 
Committee member, e-mail message to author, April 28, 2005). This commissioner also 
noted that the commission was formed for the benefit of the elected representatives of the 
riot area, but that there was never a “concrete initiative” for real reform. This comment 
illustrates the way in which commissions are created for the appearance of action and 
accountability but often with no genuine plans for change. 
The four commissions created to study the 1992 Los Angeles riot each produced 
final reports that were virtually ignored by the media and thus the public. The reports tended 
to be very short and vague, calling on many groups outside of government—from 
philanthropic charities to small businesses—to invest their time and resources in the riot 
areas. However, it seems very unlikely that these groups would even be reading the reports 
since there was no effort to publicly distribute the reports.  
In the end, the four commissions that were instituted in the aftermath of the 1992 
riot did little more than advocate for economic reforms to try to increase economic growth 
in Los Angeles. For instance, urban enterprise zones, which would give tax credits to 
businesses that invest in and set up shop within the zones, were heavily promoted by the 
commissions. Race relations and racial inequality played a marginal, if any, role in all four 
reports. However, even with a more right-of-center commission report, little action was 
taken on the recommendations.  
To an even greater extent than their predecessors, these 1992 commissions had 
almost no success in implementing any of their recommendations. The riots had erupted six 
months before the 1992 presidential election and both candidates quickly touted urban 
enterprise zones as a panacea for the region’s social problems. On May 8, 1992, Democratic 
candidate Bill Clinton appeared on CNN the week after the riot and was asked about 
President Bush’s recovery plans, to which he replied: “it sounded like what I’ve been 
advocating for years in terms of…getting back to grassroots empowerment and enterprise 
initiatives” (Box 3, OA/ID 41420, Cabinet Affairs Collection, George H.W. Bush 
Presidential Library). Two weeks after the riot, President Bush issued an “Urban Aid 
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Initiative” statement – a six point action plan that included a call for urban enterprise zones, 
as well as a “weed and seed” initiative that would “weed” out crime from the community 
and then “seed” it with expanded social services (President George H.W. Bush. 1992. 
“Statement on Urban Aid Initiatives”). However, the day after the 1992 presidential 
election, President Bush vetoed a long-term aid package for the riot-affected areas, despite 
the fact that the bill included enterprise zones and “weed and seed” initiatives that he had 
championed throughout the campaign and that were recommended by the riot commissions.  
The three riots and their commissions discussed above illustrate the way in which 
independent commissions submit the riot to a bureaucratic process that de-politicizes the 
violence. However, the stage in which this “processing away” of the crisis occurs varies 
from commission to commission. For instance, the Kerner Commission was most evasive in 
the implementation stage, while the Chicago Commission had the most problems in the 
commission stage. I turn now to the 9/11 Commission to show the similarities between this 
very prominent national security commission and the riot commissions. Like the riot 
commissions, the 9/11 Commission faced a number of obstacles, such as funding shortages, 
time constraints, commissioner disagreements, a noncompliant executive, and hesitancy to 
implement reform. 
 
The 9/11 Commission 
The 9/11 Commission (formally, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States) was born out of the intense and unrelenting lobbying of the families of the 
9/11 victims. Its mandate—“to investigate the facts and circumstances relating to the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001” (9/11 Commission Report 2004, xv)—was 
sweeping. According to Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton, the mandate was 
perhaps too broad, asking them to investigate the entire U.S. government in an effort to 
understand an unprecedented event (Kean and Hamilton 2006, 14). The wide-ranging nature 
of the Commission was likely a result of the hesitance of both the White House and 
Congress to institute the Commission at all.
i
 The Bush administration made clear from the 
beginning that the Commission not be a “runaway commission” used as an institutionalized 
stage for public Bush-bashing. In those same early meetings in which top White House 
officials expressed runaway commission concerns, they also emphasized the limitations of 
time and money awarded to the Commission – and warned not to ask for more of either. It 
is therefore not surprising that two years after the 9/11 Commission report was released, 
Kean and Hamilton declared: “We were set up to fail” (Kean and Hamilton 2006, 14). 
 The chief obstacle to the formation of the 9/11 Commission was the most likely 
target of such an investigation—the White House. House Republicans were almost as wary 
of the Commission and according to Kean and Hamilton, “not inclined to help the 
Commission succeed [and] holding the budget at $3 million was one way to ensure that [it] 
did not” (Kean and Hamilton 2006, 43). The Commission was indeed given just $3 million 
to work with, far below what is normal for an independent commission, particularly one 
with such an expansive mandate. In comparison, the commission set up twenty years earlier 
to investigate the Challenger space shuttle disaster was given a budget of $40 million. Even 
early estimates of the 9/11 Commission projected it would run out of money a full year 
before its scheduled reporting date. In early 2003, the Commission pushed both Congress 
and the White House for more money but faced resistance from both. The White House 
initially denied requests while House Republicans continued to stonewall. In the end, both 
branches provided enough money to comfortably sustain the Commission for its duration. 
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Thus, despite dire concerns at the outset, funding would prove to be the least of the 
problems for the 9/11 Commission.  Even more troublesome issues would arise to hinder 
the Commission from the beginning: lack of infrastructure, timing, and subpoena power. 
Each is discussed below. 
 From the beginning, the Commission lacked the infrastructure required to run a 
proper investigation of such a huge crisis. Two months after its inception, the 
commissioners still had no office, no schedule for work, no security clearance, and only one 
employee. Staff interviews took place in executive director Philip Zelikow’s hotel room in 
Washington, DC. Lacking a commission telephone, the cell phone of Zelikow’s assistant 
became the main commission telephone number.  Four months into the commission process, 
the commissioners finally held their first public hearing, but found themselves with no 
gavel.    
As with the riot commissions above, timing for the 9/11 Commission was also an 
obstacle. It was given just a year and a half to conduct research, hold hearings, and write the 
final report. Again, such timing restrictions illustrate that appointing bodies often do not 
want commissions to delve too deeply into the issues, preferring that they instead engage in 
a surface-level investigation. Ultimately, the 9/11 Commission asked for only a two month 
extension, pushing its report release from May 2004 to July 2004. This did not please 
anyone, as it meant that the report would be released at the height of the presidential 
election cycle and amidst the Republican and Democratic National Conventions. With the 
help of Senators McCain and Lieberman, the extension was granted by Congress but not 
without a fight from politicians from both parties.  
Finally, the issue of subpoena power was a contentious one from the beginning, 
both within the Commission and for the 9/11 families. The Commission was granted the 
power when it was created, but it required the vote of 6 out of 10 commissioners to issue a 
subpoena. Partisanship crept in, with Democratic commissioners generally favoring the 
wide use of subpoenas and Republican commissioners favoring a more limited, if any, use 
of subpoena power.  Vice Chairman Hamilton broke from his Democratic colleagues on this 
issue and sided with Kean, thus ending debate on the possibility of the aggressive use of the 
subpoena. Those who favored reserving the subpoenas for non-compliance felt that blanket 
subpoenas would be unnecessarily antagonistic toward the White House; something they 
feared would backfire and cause more non-compliance. The argument was that the 
Commission should make the administration see the Commission as on its side, as part of 
the same team looking for answers. In the end, the subpoenas were used infrequently and 
only against non-compliant agencies like the FAA and the Pentagon. Two things seemed to 
work more effectively in gaining compliance: threat of subpoena and public shaming. The 
latter was achieved through such mechanisms as interim reports that mentioned “slow 
starts” and “delays” and through media interviews that hinted at some executive branch 
recalcitrance. All of the tactics worked to some extent, with the Commission eventually 
gaining access to the coveted Presidential Daily Briefings (PDBs), but the 9/11 Commission 
process can generally be categorized as involving high levels of non-cooperation from 
government agencies. It is the nature of the independent commission – the appointing body 
has little incentive to cooperate beyond the creation of the Commission, which lacks any 
true authority in holding the appointing body accountable.  
Thus, these issues of funding, infrastructure, timing, and subpoena power were 
overshadowed by the biggest obstacle of all—government resistance in cooperating with the 
Commission. Many government officials showed disdain for the Commission from the 
beginning, which seemed to only foreshadow the eventual dismissal of the final 
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Commission report. Thus, while the commissioners publicly stated that they eventually got 
what they needed from government officials, their frustration with regard to lack of 
government compliance during the process was widely recognized as media outlets 
continued to report on the stonewalling of many government agencies and branches. The 
result was what many, particularly the 9/11 families, viewed as a watered-down final report 
with weak recommendations that would likely never be enacted.  
I turn now to the second stage of the commission process—the recommendation 
stage. The report was written for the layperson and policymaker alike so it seems to offer 
the symbolic sense of accountability for the American people, while also offering insight to 
government officials on how certain warnings were completely missed despite the fact that 
“the system was blinking red” (9/11 Commission Report 2004, 254). The Commission 
points out failures of imagination, policy, capabilities, and management, suggesting that 
those within the security community did not have the imagination to understand the gravity 
of the threat, nor the institutions and capabilities to deal with a new kind of terrorist threat. 
Instead, it found an outdated security system stuck in the last stages of the Cold War and a 
gaping hole in security communications between those studying foreign threats and those 
studying domestic threats. There was also a general confusion about the sharing and use of 
information gathered in the various intelligence channels. The recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission focus generally on the antiquated security capabilities, as well as the detached 
relationships between the various entities involved in threat information, collection, and 
dissemination.  
In some respects, the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission are assertive. The 
recommendations speak to the fact that, prior to the 9/11 attacks, national security was stuck 
in a “system designed generations ago for a world that no longer exists” (9/11 Commission 
Report 2004, 399). As such, the commissioners recommended significant restructuring of 
the government, including the institution of a National Counterterrorism Center to unify 
strategic intelligence and operational planning, the appointment of a National Intelligence 
Director, installation of a network-based information-sharing system, strengthening 
congressional oversight of national security and the intelligence community, and 
strengthening the FBI and homeland defenders. The restructuring calls for a shifting of lines 
of authority, and an integration of intelligence information, as well as clear delineations of 
responsibility, (for instance, between the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security) 
so as to make the government more efficient while still responsive. The commissioners 
were concerned about the “balkanization” of the intelligence and security community and in 
writing the recommendations, were driven by the notion of quarterbacking – namely, “who 
is in charge?” The commissioners consistently questioned who exactly was directing the 
budget, personnel, and priorities of the fifteen intelligence agencies that were spread 
throughout the government. Kean and Hamilton write, “Nobody had a satisfactory answer” 
(Kean and Hamilton 2006, 282).
 
 
These more tangible recommendations follow its more symbolic recommendations 
regarding foreign policy, including identifying and prioritizing terrorist sanctuaries, 
reaching out, listening to, and working with other countries, offering an “example of moral 
leadership in the world,” defining the United States in the Muslim world, and developing a 
“common coalition approach toward the detention and humane treatment of captured 
terrorists” (9/11 Commission Report 2004, 380). The Commission calls such 
recommendations “a global strategy,” and they reflect the Commission’s overall diplomatic 
stance on foreign policy. The multilateral foreign policy orientation of the Commission’s 
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recommendations is in sharp contrast to the Bush administration’s preference for unilateral 
action. It is therefore not surprising that the White House resisted the recommendations and 
that implementation was only marginally attempted or achieved.
ii
 I turn now to the third 
stage of the commission process as it is in this last stage that the 9/11 Commission faced its 
biggest challenges and had the highest levels of commission politics. 
As mentioned above, in late 2005, the commissioners re-convened and issued 
mostly failing grades for progress made on implementing the recommendations. They noted 
that they had seen “positive steps toward carrying out the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission, but still found much to be done” (Kean and Hamilton 2006, 341). A year later 
in the 2006 midterm elections, the Democrats campaigned on 9/11 reform and 
implementation of the recommendations. When they were swept into power in Congress, 
they quickly passed a bundle of reform laws aimed at implementing some of the 9/11 
Commission’s recommendations. However, implementation still falls far short of what the 
9/11 Commission had proposed in what some—particularly the 9/11 families—saw as an 
already watered-down report.  
A year before the issuance of the failing grade report card, President Bush signed 
into law the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Getting the bill 
passed was a difficult task, with most intelligence reform resistance coming from ardent 
supporters of the Department of Defense who did not want to see reapportionment of power 
away from the Pentagon. After a conference committee bill was hobbled together in the fall 
of 2004, enough votes were lined up to pass the bill. But lacking the majority of Republican 
caucus votes, Speaker Dennis Hastert failed to bring the bill up for a vote. However, 
opposition came from outside Congress as well. Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS) told Fox News 
after the unraveling of the compromise bill: “I don’t think it was only House 
Republicans…There’s been a lot of opposition to this from the first. Some of it is 
turf…some of it is from the Pentagon. Some of it, quite frankly, is from the White House, 
despite what the president has said” (Stolberg 2004). Senator Roberts’ concerns echoed 
what many feared; namely, that the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission did not have 
the full, or even partial, backing of the executive branch. Nonetheless, a compromise bill 
was reached with President Bush sending Congress a letter urging its passage. 
The act did contain some tangible reforms that were recommended by the 9/11 
Commission, such as the establishment of a Director of National Intelligence and a National 
Counterterrorism Center. However, it also centered on less substantive issues, for instance, 
stating: “the United States should encourage reform, freedom, democracy, and opportunity 
for Muslims; and the United States should work to defeat extremism in all its form, 
especially in nations with predominantly Muslim populations by providing assistance to 
governments, governmental organizations, and individuals who promote modernization” 
(Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 2004). The means for achieving such 
goals are imprecise and it is clear that later, the Bush administration took a more forceful 
approach in trying to achieve these aims, whereas the 9/11 Commission report had 
emphasized more of a soft-power diplomatic approach.  
In the end, the 9/11 commissioners were pleased at the passage and signing of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.  Kean and Hamilton write: “With the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, some of [the] defects were 
addressed—notably, the structure of our national security agencies. Yet no law is self-
executing…It will take years to see if our recommendations are implemented effectively to 
correct the defects they were intended to address” (Kean and Hamilton 2006, 318).  
In fact, Kean and Hamilton waited only one year before they took action and 
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publicly condemned the government for not being more proactive in its pace of 
recommendation implementation. At the press conference on December 4, 2005 in which 
they issued the report card, Chairman Kean gave opening remarks and openly expressed his 
frustration: 
Many obvious steps that the American people assume have been completed, have 
not been. Our leadership is distracted. Some of these failures are shocking. Four 
years after 9/11: It is scandalous that police and firefighters in large cities still 
cannot communicate reliably in a major crisis. It is scandalous that airline 
passengers are still not screened against names on the terrorist watch list. It is 
scandalous that we still allocate scarce homeland security dollars on the basis of 
pork barrel spending, not risk…We believe that the terrorists will strike again. If 
they do, and these reforms have not been implemented, what will our excuses be? 
While the terrorists are learning and adapting, our government is still moving at a 
crawl (Kean and Hamilton 2006, 341-342).  
Hamilton pointedly accused the FBI of “inertia” and “complacency” and Republican 
commissioner John F. Lehman declared that “none of it is rocket science” (Williams 2005). 
At the press conference, the Commission spoke vaguely about who was responsible for lack 
of implementation and did not mention the Bush administration in particular. They 
recognized that some steps had been taken but they noted that what’s missing is 
“effectiveness” of implementation – in other words, the reforms lacked teeth.  
Two years after the press conference, they again spoke of lack of real 
implementation. For instance, they noted that as of 2007, a Director of National Intelligence 
had been installed but that he lacked full control over all the various intelligence agencies, a 
role that was central and crucial to their reasoning for recommendation of the position. They 
also noted that the FBI had reformed itself slightly but serious problems remained: 
“inadequate information technology, deficiencies in analytical capabilities, too much 
turnover in the workforce and leadership, and insufficient investment in human capital and 
training” (Kean and Hamilton 2006, 341-342). In other words, six years after the 9/11 
attacks, three years after the release of its report, and two years after issuing a failing report 
card on progress, the 9/11 Commission members remained disappointed at the evasion 
tactics of a government in which all of them had served.  
 There was one area of lack of implementation that particularly irked Chairman 
Kean and Vice-Chairman Hamilton – the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. In 
the section labeled “A layered security system,” the 9/11 Commission calls for an executive 
branch board to “oversee adherence to the guidelines we recommend and the commitment 
the government makes to defend our civil liberties” (9/11 Commission Report 2004, 395). 
They offer the following rationale for the recommendation: “We must find ways of 
reconciling security with liberty, since the success of one helps protect the other. The choice 
between security and liberty is a false choice…if our liberties are curtailed we lose the 
values that we are struggling to defend.” Previous recommendations had hinted at increased 
government authority in maintaining U.S. security, and recommendations such as these 
seemed to be the Commission’s attempt to warn against too much consolidation of 
governmental power. In Without Precedent, Kean and Hamilton note that the Commission 
did recommend some strong powers to protect us, but recommendations such as the Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board were meant to provide a “strong voice on behalf of 
individual and civil liberties” (Kean and Hamilton 2006, 325-326). However, by 
recommending that the civil liberties board be within the executive branch, they were 
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asking the branch to oversee itself; lack of implementation should have been anticipated.  
And yet Congress did create the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board in the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act signed by President Bush in December 
2004. Section 1061 of the Act notes that “in conducting the war on terrorism, the Federal 
Government may need additional powers and may need to enhance the use of its existing 
powers [and] this potential shift of power and authority to the Federal Government calls for 
an enhanced system of checks and balances to protect the precious liberties that are vital to 
our way of life.” The erection of the civil liberties board was meant to be this check. 
However, there were three immediate problems (Isikoff 2006). First, the White House and 
congressional leaders had denied the Board basic oversight tools, such as subpoena power. 
Second, President Bush did not nominate members of the board for another six months after 
it was created and they were not confirmed for another eight months. Finally, a year and a 
half after the Board was created, it had not hired any staff members, had not held a meeting, 
and was not listed in the 2006-07 federal budget.  Critics also pointed out that the chair of 
the Board was Carol Dinkins, then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales’ former law partner. 
Another Board member’s wife was killed in the 9/11 attacks, causing critics to question his 
impartiality in the war on terrorism.  
The concerns raised by many with regard to the Board were addressed by the 
newly elected Democratic majority in Congress in 2006. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi made 
the 9/11 Commission recommendations the first order of business and introduced H.R. 1 on 
January 5, 2007. It passed the House four days later, with final passage occurring six 
months later after a conference committee. In the end, only 40 House members and 8 
Senators voted against the bill and President Bush signed it into law in August of 2007. The 
legislation fixed some of the issues with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. 
Specifically, it moved the Board out of the Executive Office, making it an independent 
agency within the executive branch. It also gave the Board subpoena power, required that 
Board members be appointed expeditiously, required that they be confirmed by the Senate, 
mandated semiannual reports to the appropriate congressional committee (including a 
minority report if one existed), and implemented the role of Privacy and Civil Liberty 
Officers to assist, advise, oversee, and investigate matters of civil liberties and privacy 
within various executive agencies (Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act 2007, Section 1, Sec. 801-804). These revisions were a step closer to the 
9/11 Commission’s vision of a post-9/11 secure democracy and along with the other 
provisions in the bill, made the recommendations more of a reality. House Democrats even 
prepared a side-by-side comparison report, showing the 9/11 Commission’s 
recommendations alongside the provisions in the 2007 legislation (U.S. House Committee 
on Homeland Security 2007).  
In May of 2007, just before the final legislation passed the conference committee, 
Kean and Hamilton gave an interview in which they noted many successes in the 
implementation of the Commission’s recommendations. When questioned about 
implementation at that point, Hamilton noted that if H.R. 1 passed—which it did—about 80 
percent of the recommendations would be implemented. Hamilton also noted that the White 
House had been generally supportive of the provisions. However, he also argued that many 
“common-sense” recommendations, such as communication methods between fire, police, 
and health officials and distribution of homeland security funds, had not been implemented. 
Kean concurred and noted: “What we're really asking for now is that some of this stuff be 
speeded up. Because what we believe is while America is safer thanks to these 
recommendations that are being implemented, we're not safe enough yet. We're really not 
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safe” (Kean and Hamilton, Interview, 2007). Kean’s distinction between “safer” and “safe” 
would provide the foundation for an editorial authored by both of them a few months later. 
 The editorial first appeared in the Sacramento Bee on the sixth anniversary of the 
9/11 attacks. It was titled, “Six Years After 9/11, We’re Not Safe Enough” (Kean and 
Hamilton 2007). The piece began with a simple question and followed it with a 
straightforward answer: 
Are we safer today? Two years ago, we and our colleagues issued a report card to 
assess the U.S. government's progress on the bipartisan recommendations in the 
9/11 commission report. We concluded that the nation was not safe enough. Our 
judgment remains the same today: We still lack a sense of urgency in the face of 
grave danger. 
What is most striking about this editorial and its warning against lack of implementation of 
the Commission’s recommendations is that a major piece of legislation was signed by 
President Bush less than one month before. Indeed, the legislation was passed and signed 
into law in between the May 2007 interview and this editorial. Yet, Kean and Hamilton 
remained unconvinced that implementation levels were sufficient. They called progress at 
home “slow” but “real” and they largely blamed the tenets of American foreign policy for 
fueling the desire and perseverance of Islamic radicals. They also pointed to the reforms 
that had occurred, including the appointment of the Director of National Intelligence and the 
erection of the National Counterterrorism Center, but noted that these reforms have not been 
as “bold” as they had imagined. For instance, they illustrate how information sharing was 
still a problem within the security community, transportation security remained mired in 
antiquated technology, and Congressional oversight of homeland security was neither 
“effective” nor “robust.” Indeed, Kean and Hamilton generally pointed out that while 
implementation efforts worked to some extent, they lacked teeth. Appointments were made, 
offices opened, and boards appointed, but lacking any real power, proper channels for 
communication, and technological updates, the reforms remained hollow.  
Four years after the editorial, on the tenth anniversary of 9/11 in 2011, Kean and 
Hamilton released another report assessing the progress made on recommendations. They 
note the many successes (including improved information sharing within the intelligence 
community and airline passenger screening), but again highlight the notable failings. In 
particular, they review nine policy recommendations, with the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Board being one area that they investigate. Kean and Hamilton do not mince words: “If we 
were issuing grades, the implementation of this recommendation would receive a failing 
mark” (National Security Preparedness Group 2011, 16). Indeed, the Board had been 
dormant for the previous three years. In the end, this ten year anniversary report notes that, 
despite “considerable progress,” these “unfulfilled” and “major” policy recommendations 
continue to put the security of the United States at risk (National Security Preparedness 
Group 2011, 6).  
 The 9/11 Commission thus saw its highest levels of commission politics in the first 
(commission) and third (implementation) stages, though the second (recommendation) stage 
was not without problems either.  In the initial, commission stage, there was much foot-
dragging and resistance to the very idea of a 9/11 Commission. This was followed by the 
familiar commission tactics of underfunding and understaffing. Eventually, the members 
pushed through the commission process and issued a fairly hard-hitting report. However, in 
the final, implementation stage, the commissioners were again met with resistance and 
egregious defiance of their recommendations. In a move that was upsetting and yet expected 
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by this point, the White House told the 9/11 families that they would set up its own 
“working group” to study the 9/11 Commission’s final report and make their own 
recommendations to the president (Breitweiser 2006, 205). The idea of setting up a new 
commission to report on a previous commission is not a new one – riot commissions have 
long employed such tactics. Two decades after the 1965 McCone Commission that studied 
the Watts riot, it was suggested that another commission be instituted to study the first 
commission and in 1967 President Johnson appointed mini-commissions within government 
agencies to review Kerner Commission recommendations and essentially give their own 
recommendations. Thus, the 9/11 Commission’s processing of the 2001 attacks is similar to 
that of the riot commissions of years past. Indeed, America has a dependence on 
independent commissions.  
 
Conclusion 
The tactics and trends of riot commissions are thus mirrored in the 9/11 Commission. Kean 
and Hamilton’s exposé of the commission process, Without Precedent, has a misleading 
title, given the long history of commission politics in the United States. There is indeed 
precedent – independent commissions in the United States have been bureaucratizing and 
“processing away” major events, such as riots and the 9/11 attacks, for at least a century. 
Observers of political commissions could thus expect similar results with other independent 
commissions. 
 The de-politicization of events such as riots, natural disasters, and wars that occurs 
when commissions are appointed portrays the way in which the government effectively 
minimizes any responsibility while also appearing to be responsive and accountable. The 
issue, of course, is that any potential lessons are ignored as failure to invoke change results 
in “a disturbing echo of failed practices,” as Kean and Hamilton (2007) stated. Given the 
center-right nature of the American political system, it is perhaps easier to understand why 
the status quo would be desired by political elites as a result of the riot commissions, but it 
is less clear why it would be of any good with a national security crisis. 
 This study began with a puzzle—how is that independent commissions are 
simultaneously effective and ineffective? And what are the effects of this paradox on the 
status of democracy in America? Substantive policy shifts are a rare outcome of 
independent commissions, making them rather ineffective. However, they are very effective 
mechanisms of evasion that allow government officials to claim responsibility and 
accountability, while also satiating public demand for answers. It is a troubling combination 
for American democracy as the government receives high marks from the American public 
for being responsive but an actual—or real—response is absent.  
This article has also shown the ways in which government in America, through the 
use of independent commissions, evades responsibility at many different stages in the 
commission process. Some are more elusive in the initial, commission-formation stages, 
such as the Chicago Commission, while others, like the 1992 Los Angeles commissions, are 
also vague, and thus lacking in substance, in the middle, recommendation stage. Still others 
are more evasive in the latter stages, such as the Kerner Commission and the 9/11 
Commission, when they are making recommendations or seeking implementation. This 
model helps us to understand where and at what stage in the process the de-politicization is 
most severe. Knowing this, public officials can begin to institute more effective 
commissions.  
Are commissions inherently ineffective? In fact, they are not. Adequate resources 
(timing and funding), a body set up to oversee implementation (such as the 9/11 
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Commission’s Public Discourse Project), inclusion of costs of recommendations as part of 
the final report, and an actual balance of representation on the commission in terms of 
membership, are all aspects that would help to make the independent commission process 
effective, accountable, and an agent for positive political and social change.  
 
i 
A small, bipartisan group of Senators and Members of Congress was primarily responsible 
for the creation of the 9/11 Commission. Coupled with the intense and compelling advocacy 
of 9/11 families, opposition to the commission’s formation was overcome. 
ii
 It should be noted that the 9/11 families were not satisfied with recommendations, finding 
them to be distilled and watered-down. They would end up being even more disappointed 
with the rate of implementation. 
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